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In 1957, Skinner, in his “Verbal Behavior”, proposed an explanation on how a language
is learned. In 1959, Chomsky strongly argued the non-learnability of language, establishing
in the field of developmental psycholinguistics the substitution of the term “learning” for
that of “acquisition”. Currently, the constructivist models describe language acquisition
as a process of ontogenetic, gradual, complex, and adaptive change. This new theoretical
framework has been especially useful for rereading Verbal Behavior because it facilitates
recovering the Skinnerian learning mechanisms. This can be observed in the recent research
trends that recapture reinforcement and imitation (echoic responses), although they are
now located in the initial phases of the process and are included in a cognitive dynamic
that, by gradually increasing its complexity, can achieve grammar. The new constructivist
theoretical framework, by retrieving the functional and referential aspects of language,
can also take advantage of the classic Skinnerian proposal about the pragmatic types of
verbal behavior, providing it with new meaning.
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En 1957 Skinner, en su obra Conducta Verbal, propuso una explicación sobre cómo se
aprende un lenguaje. En 1959 Chomsky argumentó contundentemente la no aprendibilidad
del lenguaje instaurando en el ámbito de la psicolingüística evolutiva la sustitución del
término aprendizaje por el de adquisición. En la actualidad los modelos constructivistas
describen la adquisición del lenguaje como un proceso de cambio ontogenético, gradual,
complejo y adaptativo. Este nuevo marco teórico ha resultado especialmente idóneo para
la re-lectura de la Conducta Verbal porque permite cierta recuperación de los mecanismos
de aprendizaje skinnerianos. Esto se manifiesta en las recientes líneas de investigación
que recuperan el refuerzo y la imitación (respuestas ecoicas) aunque localizándolos en
las fases iniciales del proceso e incluyéndolos en una dinámica cognitiva que, al aumentar
gradualmente su complejidad, puede llegar a obtener una gramática. Además, el nuevo
marco teórico constructivista, al recuperar las vertientes funcionales y referenciales del
lenguaje, puede aprovechar la clásica propuesta skinneriana sobre los tipos pragmáticos
de conducta verbal, dotándola de un nuevo sentido.
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The cognitive system is capable of developing a language
by means of a process of change whose most significant
milestones are found in the first years of life. The Skinnerian
proposal about how this system interacts with the linguistic
and extralinguistic experience to learn a language appears
in Skinner’s (1957) Verbal Behavior. Due to the fact that it
focused exclusively on this experience (as dispenser of the
behavior to be imitated and of the appropriate reinforcement
program for shaping behavior), it was literally flattened by
Chomsky’s (1959) critique. The Chomskian model
(innatist—not developmental-formalist) proposes to explain
the acquisition of language, reducing to the bare minimum
the role of experience. Sixty years after the development of
cognitive psychology, the knowledge accumulated about the
mind’s functioning is stimulating psycholinguists to relocate
the topic in question to a more psychological area. This
relocation can be specified in the following question: Why
does a child acquire, and not learn, a language?
The term acquisition is in consonance with the Chomskian
model. In this work, we propose to analyze what this model
is based on and how the current theoretical perspectives
(grouped under the general name of “constructivism”) offer
a rigorous alternative, and can also integrate some aspects
noted in Skinner’s Verbal Behavior in a new framework. 
In the first place, constructivism conceives the development
of language as a process of change that takes place during
ontogenesis. This proposal differs from the Chomskian
representational-grammatical innatism, although it does not
discard other types of innatism (structural or chronotopic).
This constructivist notion can recover the fact that Skinner’s
arguments never exceed the framework of the child’s
interaction with the environment. As we now know, this
framework is prior to birth. 
In the second place, constructivism conceives the
development of language as a global process. The complexities
of language are not resolved, but are instead gradually built.
The basic Skinnerian mechanisms of learning, reinforcement
and imitation, are being retrieved as necessary to account for
the initial phases of this development. But constructivism
exceeds the Skinnerian model many times over because the
latter does not explain the emergence of grammatical
complexity. 
In the third place, constructivism conceives the
development of language as a process of adaptive change.
Skinnerian verbal behavior proposes contingency relations
(referential in the tacts, pragmatic in the mands) with
experience. This viewpoint can be recovered in the new
theoretical framework because, contrary to the Chomskian
model, it contemplates the development of grammatical
knowledge—absent in Skinner—as a huge adaptive success
of the process of linguistic development. 
The use of the term language “acquisition” is generalized
in the field of psycholinguistics and refers to the process of
cognitive change, of vital importance to children, which takes
place in the first years of life and culminates in the mastery
of the grammar of their language. But why does a child
“acquire” and not “learn” a language? In order to answer this
question, we must go back to Skinner’s work (Verbal Behavior,
1957) and the critique of this work by Chomsky (Review of
B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior, 1959). Skinner was interested
in the behavioral aspect of language. Chomsky was interested
in the origin of the grammatical knowledge that organizes it.
Thus, in Verbal Behavior, Skinner described language
as a behavior that, as such, is learned: “A child learns verbal
behavior when utterances relatively lacking in pattern, and
which are selectively reinforced, gradually take on forms
that produce the appropriate consequences in a given verbal
community” (Skinner, 1957, p. 40).
Chomsky’s criticism of this work led research to focus
on the origin of the grammatical knowledge that a child
begins to exhibit from the age of 30 months. But, for this
purpose, Chomsky assumed that language is unlearnable.
He argued (Chomsky, 1959, 1995), that language was not
learnable because:
1. Language is a surprisingly early acquisition that,
nevertheless, involves building a complex formal system
(grammar). And this is performed by a cognitive system
that is still prelogical and preoperative. 
2. Language is acquired with no apparent effort.
3. Language is acquired without any explicit instruction,
that is, nobody teaches the child to talk. 
4. Language is acquired despite “stimulus poverty.”
Grammatical information is not found explicitly in the
stimulus input and, in addition, this input contains informative
noise, interruptions, differences between speakers, and is
grammatically incomplete. 
Chomsky’s critique has come to be considered as one
of the essential factors in the transition towards cognitive
psychology. Its specific influence in developmental
psycholinguistics is still evident nowadays, 60 years later,
in the generalized adoption of the term “acquisition.” This
term contains three implicit criticisms of Skinner: 
1. Linguistic knowledge can be “learned” because it is
predetermined by genetic grammatical knowledge: The
acquisition process is guided by the principles of Universal
Grammar, transmitted genetically. 
2. In any case, linguistic knowledge is the result of a
very complex learning process, which Skinner’s model does
not explain, or explains very scarcely.
3. Grammatical knowledge is the result of specialized
learning mechanisms, different from general cognitive
mechanisms, and determined genetically in a specific way.
Language acquisition mechanisms are not general at any
point in the process. 
Thus, the term “acquisition” began with Chomskian,
linguistic roots, and it emphasized the notion that grammar
is triggered by the environment rather than learned. Also,
grammatical development would be independent of other
kinds of developments, linguistic or otherwise: semantic,
pragmatic, cognitive.
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But this term was maintained in alternative models
(“constructivism”) to Chomsky’s model, as evidence grew
revealing that the grammar of a language is learned, but in
a very complex way. Evidence showed that it was not
sufficient to “land” in a linguistic setting (according to
Skinner, a setting that provides the input to be learned and
that reinforces progressive approximations to the input) but
instead, it was necessary to add internal cognitive dynamics
of which no trace is found in behavioral theories. 
Currently, recent advances in psycholinguistics and
developmental neuroscience (López Ornat, 2003b) allow us
to conceive that language is “learned” from a genetic
inheritance that is not specifically grammatical, by means
of an extremely complex process of self-organized and time-
taking change (until adolescence). 
The goal of this work is to review Skinner’s contributions
in the current context, with the aim of rescuing them as basic
mechanisms contributing to early language learning. As general
mechanisms of cognitive change, which may help explain the
first–pregrammatical–steps of the acquisition process, without
forgetting that the following steps require much more complex
theories, capable of accounting for the deep representational
changes involved in language acquisition. These more complex
theories are currently grouped under labels such as
“constructivism,” “cognitive-developmental neuroscience,”
and “emergentism” (Beer, 2000; López Ornat, 1991, 1994,
1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003a, 2003b; Quartz & Sejnowski,
1997). They all respond to the Chomskian challenge to explain
the emergence of grammar, but they respond from the
assumption of the learnability of grammar during ontogenesis.
The most interesting aspect for us now is that, through
learnability, we can recover the basic Skinnerian mechanisms
of reinforcement and imitation and claim their intervention at
the starting point of linguistic development. The novelty is
that this learnability, in contrast to Skinnerian learnability,
assumes the complexity that this system gradually achieves
when it is grammatically formalized. 
Another Skinnerian viewpoint that can be recovered by
constructivism is the functional approach (Tomasello, 2003)
as such: During language development, a formalization process
occurs which is performed by a living system that has to
adapt and that, by becoming grammatical, is better adapted.
The development of grammar is a huge adaptive success. 
We will now specify our proposal about some Skinner
contributions that are relevant for current theories. We shall
do this within the three learnability assumptions: The
development of language is a process of change that is: (a)
ontogenetic, (b) gradual and complex, and (c) adaptive.
Language Development as an Ontogenetic Change
Process 
A functional analysis of the verbal community is not part
of this book, but a few standard problems call for comment.
One of them is the old question of the origin of language. Early
man was probably not very different from his modern
descendants with respect to behavioral processes. If brought
in to a current verbal community, he would probably develop
elaborate verbal behavior. What was lacking was not any special
capacity for speech but certain environmental circumstances
(Skinner, 1957, p. 461).
As mentioned, the arguments in favor of the genetic
origin of grammar have greatly influenced developmental
psycholinguistics. Despite various modifications of these
theories, from this perspective, no convincing explanations
have been generated to explain issues such as interlingual
differences or irregularities. Representational innatism has
not been very convincing and it lacks a physiological base.
In turn, constructivism accepts architectural innatism—
neuron types, cortical layers…, and chronotopy: timing of
linguistic maturation (Elman 1993; Elman et al., 1996). It
is currently known that, at birth, children have already begun
to learn to process linguistic information, limited to prosodic
information, which is audible in the uterus during the last
three months of pregnancy (Jusczyk, 1997; Lecanuet &
Granier-Deferre, 1993), and that they gradually learn to give
meaning to the entire linguistic input.
A recoverable aspect of Verbal Behavior is that it places
explanations, with no hesitancy, in the postnatal period, so
that development becomes dependent on experience
(Santacruz, 1987). Readers are reminded that in Skinner’s
and Chomsky’s times, until 1995, no one knew that this
experience could begin during the 7th month of gestation. 
We believe that it is interesting to recover the function
of experience because it guides research towards the
discovery of the relations between experience and cognitive
change (Tomasello, 2000). Nowadays, this is the nucleus of
the problem and issues of genetic inheritance are in the
periphery. Whatever the genetic inheritance may be, at birth,
grammar, language, and verbal behavior are not yet present.
How are the first steps taken towards these processes? And
how can Skinner’s theory contribute to our comprehension
of them? These are the questions we focus on in the
following sections.
The Development of Language as a Process of
Gradual and Complex Change
The parent sets up a repertoire of responses by reinforcing
many instances of a response. Obviously, a response must
appear at least once before it is strengthened by reinforcement.
It does not follow, however, that all the complex forms of adult
behavior are in the child’s unconditioned vocal repertoire. The
parent need not wait for the emergence of the final form.
Responses of great intricacy can be constructed in the behavior
of an organism through a procedure illustrated […] (Skinner,
1957, p. 29).
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In teaching the young child to talk, the formal specifications
upon which reinforcement is contingent are at first greatly
relaxed. Any response which vaguely resembles the standard
behavior of the community is reinforced. When these begin to
appear frequently, a closer approximation is insisted upon. In
this manner, very complex verbal forms may be reached.
(Skinner, 1957, pp. 29-30).
The above fragments of Verbal Behavior show how
Skinner accounted for the learning of language. In this
explanation, we can emphasize two facets: 
1. The gradual conception of language: parents reinforce
the successive approximations to the adult linguistic model.
Skinner thereby proposed that the first productions are far from
the model and that, in successive steps, they come closer and
closer. He also indicated the essential need for a model. Both
issues are current and coherent with the constructivist viewpoint. 
2. However, the Skinnerian conception of this learning is
linear: “his” learning system is not a system that changes as
a result of its activity (Mateo, 2000). Skinner’s learning
mechanisms cannot change and, therefore, cannot ever induce
grammar. 
For years, in the field of language acquisition, theories
of Chomskian influence (Chomsky, 1959, 1995) proposed
that linguistic knowledge develops as a result of the
triggering action of the environment and is acquired without
errors when the speaker’s linguistic competence is activated.
Contrariwise, from the constructivist viewpoint, the language-
acquisition-system is a complex adaptive system (Bedau,
2003) that is gradually transformed (López Ornat, 1994).
Hence, the gradualness of development is valid again today.
Specifically, we suggest that, in order to understand the
beginning stages of linguistic development–—pregrammatical
ones—which are strongly but not exclusively dependent on
experience, Skinner-rooted notions are once more taken into
account. In fact, we will comment upon some current
research trends that reflect and redescribe two of these
notions: reinforcement and “imitation.”
What does gradual mean?
The kinds of behavior in which we are usually interested
have, as we have seen, an effect upon the environment which
has a return effect upon the organism. Such behavior may be
distinguished from activities which are primarily concerned
with the internal economy of the organism by calling activities
which operate upon the environment “operant behavior.” Any
unit of such behavior is conveniently called “an operant.” For
most purposes, “operant” is interchangeable with the traditional
“response,” but the terms permit us to make the distinction
between an instance of behavior (‘So-and-so smoked a cigarette
between 2:00 and 2:10 yesterday’) and a kind of behavior
(cigarette smoking). The term “response” is often used for both
of these, although it does not carry the second meaning easily.
The description of an instance of behavior does not require a
description of related variables or of a functional relation. The
term operant, on the other hand, is concerned with the
prediction and control of a kind of behavior. Although we
observe only instances, we are concerned with laws which
specify kinds (Skinner, 1957, p. 20).
Skinner distinguished two response levels: the unit, which
is a simple response, and the operant response, which is a
response category. This distinction can be related to the
current differentiation between tokens and types (Plunkett,
1993, 1995). According to the notion of local learning
(Lieven, Behrens, Spears, & Tomasello, 2003), both natural
and artificial neural networks learn to respond to types from
their experience with tokens. This develops into a learning
language process that, at first, advances practically item-by-
item. A certain language structure (an inflection, an
agreement, a syntactic structure) will only be used correctly
with/for one or a few words, and not with others. Also, a
linguistic production (word or phrase) will only be used
correctly at first in/for specific local contexts, and not in
generalized ones. In the transition from tokens to types, it
is interesting to detect when an utterance switches from
being an unanalyzed block to a being framework with
interchangeable parts (Lieven, Pine, & Baldwin, 1997; Pine
& Lieven, 1997; Smith, Nix, Davey, López-Ornat, & Messer,
2003). For example, at 18 months, a little girl learned the
utterance I want cookies to subsequently extend it to different
objects: I want crayons, I want Papa, and I want Michael. 
However, the gradual increase in complexity does not
only affect production or linguistic output. Other recent
research trends point out that, throughout the entire
development of language, both the input and the learning
system become more complex. The system filters the
quantity and quality of input it receives as a function of its
developmental state (Elman, 1993; López Ornat, 1994) and,
in addition, it modifies itself, creating various transition
stages (López Ornat, 1996, 1997, 2001, 2003a; Mariscal,
1997, 2001). Thus, children’s intermediate grammars have
the following characteristics: 
1. Concrete: They are made up of rules that do not have
the generalization level of adult rules. For example, the
subject we studied longitudinally, María, began to produce
first-person inflections with action verbs only (Gallo, 1994a).
2. Incorrect: When children’s speech undergoes a frequent
longitudinal follow-up, grammatical errors are observed.
For example, María, when trying to incorporate pronouns
in sentences, spent some time producing errors such as: yo
no a camita [me not to bed] (verb omission), yo sabe [me
knows] (agreement), yo a sentá [I to to sit] (impersonal verb)
(Gallo, 1994a).
3. Inconsistent: Within the same observational session, there
are correct and incorrect versions of the same linguistic structure.
For example: oto utara, ota utara [another + masculine spoon,
another + feminine spoon] (inconsistency in gender agreement:
López Ornat, 1996; 2003; Mariscal, 1997; 2001).
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Current constructivist models propose a system that
starts applying general cognitive processing mechanisms
to the linguistic input until it is able to extract some partial
grammatical regularity. As children advance in the
statistical definition of partial regularities (Hauser,
Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002; López Ornat, 1994), the acquired
grammatical knowledge, which is partial and simple,
permits them to obtain new grammatical knowledge in a
way that is—comparatively—independent of experience
and more dependent on internal abstraction work (Marcus,
1999; McClelland & Plaut, 1999). From this viewpoint,
one could refer to a “learning” process in the
first–pregrammatical–phases of linguistic development
and, in advanced phases, to “grammatical acquisition.”
General Learning Mechanisms
Reinforcement
For Skinner, parents were very important as reinforcing
agents and, therefore, molders of the child’s verbal behavior.
It was subsequently shown that there are no explicit
corrections of grammatical errors (Brown & Hanlon, 1970),
that is, parents do not inform their children about whether
or not an utterance is grammatical. This was confirmed in
the authors’ longitudinal study (López Ornat, Gallo,
Fernández, & Mariscal, 1994) during which we observed
some corrections of articulatory or semantic errors, but only
one grammatical correction: 
Articulatory correction:     Age: 2.00
María: No se gompe, no se gompe, ¿sabes? [It
doesn’t bake, it doesn’t bake, you know?]
Father: Gompe no, rompe. [Not bake, break.]
María: Se me gompe. [It bakes.]
Father: Rompe. [Breaks.]
María: Guompe. [Bwakes.]
Father: Rompe. [Breaks.]
María: Gompe. No se me guompe, no se me guompe.
[(Bakes. It doesn’t bwake, it doesn’t bwake.]
Father: No. Si le pegas golpes sí que se rompe. [No.
If you hit it, it breaks.]
Semantic corrections:   Age: 1.09
Mother: Chuta. [Kick.]
María: Chuta (throws the ball).
Mother: Chuta, chutar es con el pié, María, botar
es con la mano. [Kick, kick is with your foot,
María, throw is with your hand.]
María: E pié. [E foot.]
Mother: Chutar es con el pie. [Kick is with your foot.]
Age: 1.10
María: A mancas a soubá [sleeves to poul up]
(lowering the sleeves of her sweater).
Mother: No, eso es bajarlas. [No, that’s lowering
them.]
The only grammatical correction:   Age: 2.03
Mother: ¿A qué le vas a invitar? [What are you going
to invite him to?]
Girl: Mira, a tomar una caña, parese. [Look, to a
beer, think.]
Mother: Me parece. [I think.]
These examples are complemented with what we could
call “deafness—of parents—to errors”: 
Age: 2.01 
María: Si sabo cocinar. [I know cook.]
Father: ¿Ah sí?, ¿qué sabes hacer? [Oh, yes? What
do you know how to cook?]
Age: 2.01
María: Voy a cojo una silla. ¿Eta? Eta [I go gets
chair. This one? This one.]
Father: Oye, ¡qué triciclo más bonito! [Hey, what a
pretty tricycle!]
Although it is obvious that Skinner exaggerated the
parents’ role, nonetheless, they cannot be discarded as
participants in the linguistic development of their children.
In the longitudinal study, there are three interesting parent’s
behaviors that could make up an implicit teaching program: 
1. Going down to the child’s level: The parents were
“imitating” their daughter’s proto-language: 
Age: 1.08
Mother: Oye, ¿mamá qué tiene en vez de botas?
[Hey, what does mommy have instead of boots?]
Girl: Botas. [Boots.]
Mother: Los zapatos. Díselo a papá qué son éstos.
[The shoes. Tell Papa what these are.] 
Girl: El nene….apatos. [The baby….’oes.]
Mother: Apatos. [‘Oes.]
Girl: E nene a botas. [The baby a’ boots.]
Mother: Nene a botas, ¿y mamá? [Baby a’ boots.
And mommy?]
Girl: Nene a botas. [The baby a’ boots.]
Mother: No, nene botas, ¿y mamá?[No, baby boots;
and mommy?]
Girl: Mamá apatos. [Mommy ‘oes.]
Mother: ¿Y papá? [And Papa?]
Girl: Papá apatos. [Papa ‘oes.]
Mother: Papá apatos, ¿y el nene? [Daddy ‘oes; and
the baby?]
Girl: ¡Bota! As botas. [Boots! A’ boots.]
Mother: Las botas (laughing). [The boots.]
Age: 1.07
María: ¡Oh e tete!
Mother: ¡Tete tene la nena! Espera, vamos a quitarle
los pantalones. [Oh, the girl has “tete”. Wait,
let’s take off her pants.]
María: Nena. [Girl.]
2. Reinforcing very primitive utterances:
Age: 1.07
Mother: ¿Sabes dónde vamos a ir? [Do you know
where we’re going?]
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María: A calle. [Utdoors.]
Mother: A la calle ¿con quién? [Outdoors- with whom?]
María: Apá a calle. [Ad utdoors.]
Mother: Con papá a la calle ¿y con quién más?[With
dad outdoors and who else?]
María: Apá a calle. [Ad utdoors.]
Mother: Muy bien, ¿y con quién vas a la calle? [Very
well, and with whom are you going outdoors?]
Age: 1.07
Mother: ¿Qué tenías en las manos? [What did you
have in your hands?]
María: A má caca. [A ’and dirty.]
Mother: Claro, pero cuando estabas malita tenías pupa
¿no? [Sure, but when you were sick, it hurt, no?]
3. Developing along with the child:
Age: 1.07
María: A pá. [Ap.] 
Mother: ¿A pá? [Ap’?]
María: Mn.
Mother: Venga, aupa. [Come on, up.]
Age: 2.07
María: Es que quiero ahí porque ahí no me molesta.
[I want there because there it doesn’t bother me.]
Mother: Pero es que si te pones ahí no la ve papá.
[But if you sit there, papa doesn’t see it.]
This implicit program seems to have the global aim of
promoting the child’s participation in the communicative
exchange. This participation is important because this is
how the child receives the language model. Bohannon and
Stanowick (1988) pointed out two interesting ways of
providing this model—syntactic expansions and semantic
extensions—that could even be more informative than the
simple grammatical corrections because they offer the correct
linguistic model. We will describe them below, with
examples in Spanish taken from our longitudinal study. 
Expansions: The parents complete the child’s utterances
Age: 1.07: 
María: Máa. (She looks at her hand.)
Father: ¿Eh?
María: Caca e má. [Ha’ dirty.]
Father: ¿Tienes caca en la mano? [Is your hand dirty?]
Age: 1.09: 
Mother: ¿Qué ha pasado? [What has happened?]
María: Acá. [Fell.]
Mother: ¿Te has caído? [Did you fall?]
María: Sí. [Yes.]
Mother: ¡Mecachis! [Goodness!]
Semantic extensions: The parents continue the topic
initiated by the child.
Age: 1.07:  
María: Aquí e nene. [Here a’ baby.]
Mother: Aquí el nene está muy bien. ¿A qué sí?. Un
poquito de jabón para mi nene. ¡Uy jabón!. Dame
las manitas. [The baby is fine here, right? A little
soap for my baby. Oh, soap! Give me your hands.]
Age: 1.09:
María: Chupa a meia a guau-guau. [Bow-wow lick
stocking]
Mother: ¿Te ha chupado la media el guau-guau?.
¡Mecachis!. Le vamos a hacer tas-tas [Did the
bow-wow lick your stocking? Goodness! We are
going to spank him.]
Age: 1.09:
Father: ¡Qué ojos tienes, hija! [What lovely eyes you
have, daughter!]
Girl: Caca o pes. [Dirt a’ feet.]
Father: Ya, y además de caca en los pies, tienes unos
ojos muy bonitos. [Yes, and besides dirty feet,
your eyes are very pretty.]
A systematic reinforcing program by parents has not
been observed, but instead generalized reinforcement of the
child’s participation in conversations. Nevertheless, there is
no doubt that their contribution as providers of linguistic
material on which the child’s cognitive system works, is
essential. The studies of this material began with the
description of motherese, or special speech that adults direct
to children, characterized by its simplification, exaggerated
tone, and the use of basic vocabulary and simple sentences.
Analysis has shown that it is a clear, simple, and well formed
speech that could facilitate learning (Snow & Ferguson,
1977). In order to study in detail the relation between
motherese and learning, investigations such as that of Pine
in 1994 analyze both the children’s output and their parents’
speech with the aim of determining which part of the adult
input the children work on and how they do it. 
Imitation
In the simplest case in which the verbal behavior is under the
control of verbal stimuli, the response generates a sound pattern
similar to that of the stimuli: for example, when listening to the
sound bearded, the speaker says bearded (Skinner, 1957, p. 55).
Skinner, throughout the text of Verbal Behavior, does
not talk about imitation, but rather “echoic” verbal behavior.
Despite this fact, we will use the word “imitation,” as it
refers to the same concept. 
Skinner treats imitation rather superficially, and his most
interesting contribution on this topic is to have popularized
this notion, to have guided investigation towards it. Both
the first cognitivism (Bruner, 1975) and generativism
(Chomsky, 1959) found it easy to criticize the Skinnerian
idea of imitation as a mechanism of language acquisition,
because this process clearly surpasses the limits imposed
by imitation. Therefore, the topic was loaded with negative
theoretical connotations: mechanicism, reductionism. Even
so, research was not abandoned and currently, imitation is
a vital topic both in neurocognition—developmental or
otherwise—and in cognitive science (Decety & Sommerville,
2003). 
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Sticking to imitation in the process of language acquisition,
we shall see how the current notion of imitation has changed,
it has been reutilized, and has become much more precise. 
In the first place, nowadays no one denies that—among
other things—children begin to learn language by imitating
linguistic examples. The issue is that, in the end, what they
learn is the language (the formal conventional system) and
not just speech samples. Therefore, imitation plays an
essential role in the start of the process and, at the same
time, it cannot explain the first grammatical successes, which
are partial but combinatory. The following quotation suggests
that Skinner guessed at this limitation: 
The first echoic operants acquired by a child tend to be fairly
large integral patterns, and they are of little help in permitting
him to echo novel patterns echoically. A unit repertoire at the
level of separable “speech sounds” develops later and often quite
slowly. Small echoic responses may be reinforced by parents
and others for the express purpose of building such a repertoire.
The child is taught to repeat small sound patters such as ä, sp,
and so on. Such a basic echoic repertoire may be acquired at
the same time as other forms of verbal behavior or even larger
echoic units. The child may emit responses as large as syllables,
words, or even sentences as unitary echoic operants. For help
in echoing a novel stimulus, however, he falls back upon the
single-sound repertoire (Skinner, 1957, p. 62).
The limitation of the Skinnerian treatment of the topic
does not make it less interesting. We mentioned that the modern
constructivist viewpoints have reused and modified the notion
of imitation and its developmental function. Let us see how:
1. Imitation is taken to indicate that the acquisition
process of a linguistic structure has started, that is, an initial
step, before comprehension and production of the said
structure (Fraser, Bellugi, & Brown, 1963; López Ornat,
1994). The imitated exemplars can be represented and stored
and, therefore, internally analyzed, in search for statistical
regularities (López Ornat, 1994, 1999; McClelland & Plaut,
1999; Seidenberg, 1997). In addition, the imitated exemplars
must have been perceived, that is, identified within the signal
and segmented from it. But the system must also have
oriented to these exemplars and selected them. 
2. The “predecessor” nature of linguistic imitation seems
to be reproduced on the phylogenetic scale: among the
hominids, vocal mimicry precedes the emergence of complex
articulate language by about two million years (MacWhinney,
2002). Therefore, it seems that the capacity to imitate others’
behaviors using fine-tuned sensorimotor coordination, voice,
rhythm, and melody, even without understanding/ knowing/
sharing the other’s communicative intention (vocal or gestural
mimicry), was an evolutionary step prior to the use of complex
structured language, such as ours, which would be fairly recent. 
3. However, imitation as such is currently considered to
develop: for example, in linguistic development, Pérez-Pereira
and Castro (1994) distinguish between different types of
imitation, which would have different developmental values
depending on whether the model is repeated exactly, or it is
repeated and extended, or it is repeated and reduced. They
also distinguish and compare, for a specific developmental
moment in the child, the proportion of productive utterances
to routine utterances (Pérez-Pereira, 1994), repetitions, and
imitations. 
4. Complementarily, in compared cognition (Call &
Carpenter, 2003; Tomasello, 2003), various components of
imitation are analyzed separately: action, goal, and result.
Three types of imitation are differentiated as a function of
this: imitation per se (when the subject reproduces the action,
the goal, and the result), mimicry (focused on the action),
and emulation (focused on the result). In their research with
children and chimpanzees, they attempted to arrange these
components evolutionarily. Let us see an example of imitation
produced by an 18-month old girl:
Action (linguistic utterance): ¿Quieres? ¿Quieres? [Do
you want? Do you want?] (Pregrammatical utterance: the
child did not yet produce any person discrimination in the
verbal inflection).
Goal (final aim): to get a cookie (She looks at the cupboard,
at the adult, and points to the place where the cookies are kept.
When the adult gives her the cookie, she stops saying it.)
Result (effect): She gets a cookie
5. There is another “constructivist” distinction portrayed
in this example: the time interval between the perception
of the model and the child’s utterance. This is relevant
because it allows us to distinguish deferred imitation (in the
example) as more advanced developmentally (Piaget, 1981)
than immediate imitation.
6. There is current evidence of what could be part of a
neurological support of imitation: the Mirror Neuron System
(MNS), first described in adult maccacos. This is a series
of neurons that fire not only when the subject performs an
action but also when it observes another performing that
action. It is tempting to relate this system to a support system
of social mimicry, of imitation (Decety & Sommerville,
2003), of Skinner’s echolalia. Let us see some intuition of
this notion in a fragment of Verbal Behavior: 
In the standard “word association” experiment, a stimulus
word is presented and the subject is asked to report the first he
finds himself saying in response to it. It is necessary to instruct
the subject not to repeat the stimulus word; even then, a
fragmentary echoic behavior appears in so-called “clang
associations”—responses which are alliterative or, rhyming, or
otherwise similar to the stimulus word. A fragmentary self-echoic
behavior may be shown in reduplicative forms like helter-skelter,
razzle-dazzle, and willy-nilly. Pathological echoic behavior is
seen in “echolalia,” in which a bit of speech heard by the patient
is repeated possibly many times. Echoic behavior is most
commonly observed in combination with other types of control.
In a conversation, for example, a slightly atypical response is
often picked up and passed from speaker to speaker. The two
halves of a dialogue will generally have more words in common
than two monologues on the same subject. If one speaker says
“incredible” instead of “unbelievable,” the other speaker will,
in general, and because of the present relation, say “incredible.”
A fragmentary echoic behavior is evident when one speaker
adopts the accent or mannerisms of another in the course of a
conversation. If one member of a group whispers, perhaps only
because of laryngitis, other members tend to do so (Skinner,
1957, pp. 35-36).
The existence of a mirror neuron system poses unsolved
issues, such as establishing whether the MNS develops
phylogenetically or ontogenetically, whether or not it is innate,
whether the maccacos’ MNS can be compared to that of humans,
whether mimic activity is voluntary or involuntary, and so on.
Considering the series or rereadings of the notions of
reinforcement and imitation as a whole, we see that a
“cognitive wash” has added complexity to these notions,
including their gradual changes over the acquisition process. 
Development of Language as a Process 
of Adaptive Change
Linguistics has recorded and analyzed speech sounds and
semantic and syntactical practices, but comparisons of different
languages and the tracing of historical changes have taken
precedence over the study of the individual speaker. Logic,
mathematics, and scientific methodology have recognized the
limitations which linguistic practices impose on human
thoughts, but have usually remained content with a formal
analysis, in any case, they have not developed the techniques
necessary for a causal analysis of the behavior of man thinking
(Skinner, 1957, p. 4).
Tomasello (2003), in his book, A Usage-Based Theory of
Language, proposes that the development of language should
be conceived as a series of cognitive processes working on
the linguistic input. These processes would be of general
domain, that is, they would categorize both linguistic
experience and physical and social experience. Thus, the
referential and functional roles of language would leave their
current “peripheric” position in the theories of language
acquisition, and would become first-order explanatory factors.
Hence, for Tomasello, semantics and pragmatics should be
incorporated at all levels of description, both lexical and
morphosyntactic, and at all developmental levels. 
But how can one integrate the computational aspects of
language (phonology, morphosyntax) with the conceptual
ones (semantics, pragmatic, vocabulary) in a theory of
linguistic development?
In the seventies, Bruner (1975) initiated a research trend
along these lines: From birth, the child is included in
communicative acts with the adult. In environments of high
functional value (feeding, bathing, playing, etc.), the adult
establishes protoconversations with the baby. These formats
or routines contribute to language acquisition by directing
the child’s attention towards language. 
Thus, words, like perceptual figures, stand out on a stable,
constant, and routine background: the format. In addition,
formats are the vehicle of the functionality of language or
its adaptive value, taken as the number of problems that its
use solves or as the number of problems that cannot be solved
because of its lack or deterioration (López Ornat, 1994). For
example, Halliday (1973) differentiated among three basic
pragmatic functions of infant language: instrumental (I want),
regulatory (do what I say), and interactive (you and me). 
With regard to meaning, semantic bootstrapping or
facilitation (Maratsos, 1998; Pinker, 1987), proposes that a
series of semantic outlines guide the first grammatical
acquisitions. That is, whatever their language, children start
talking about the same things. They use their first linguistic
expressions to refer to or to code common semantic notions.
These are about things existing (attribution, possession,
localization) and things happening (actor, action, patient). In
an example of infant speech such as Nene agua pumba ([Baby
water, splash] I fell into the swimming pool), the utterance is
based on previous semantic notions: agent, localization, action. 
However, these attempts to explain grammatical
acquisition from pragmatic-semantic learning have never
had the force claimed by Tomasello (2003) because they do
not solve the problem of continuity between these
acquisitions and complex grammatical acquisition. 
As we shall see in the following phrases, Skinner (Cohen,
1977) did not contemplate any qualitative leap between both
types of knowledge (pragmatic and grammatical). Thus, he
established a distinction between behavior molded by
contingencies and behavior occurring when people follow
rules extracted from these contingencies. According to
Skinner, rational behavior would imply providing reasons,
which are sentences about the contingencies. One can
manipulate rational behavior very well, as it is very similar
to behavior molded by contingencies, but with a difference.
Skinner also stated that people learn to extract rules and
justify why they follow them (Cohen, 1977).
Thus, it seems that, for Skinner, the process of
grammaticalization would be described as a process of
cognitive organization to maximize the positive consequences
of the child’s action on the environment. Verbal behaviors
are classified as a function of this behavioral goal instead
of as a function of linguistic criteria. We shall see the two
most representative classifications:
MANDs, which refer to the pragmatics of language: “In
a given verbal community, certain responses are
characteristically followed by certain consequences. ‘Wait!’
is followed by someone’s waiting and ‘Sh-h!’ by silence”
(Skinner, 1957, p. 35).
TACTs, which refer to the semantics of language: “The
term carries a mnemonic suggestion of behavior which “makes
contact” with the physical world” (Skinner, 1957, p. 81).
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Both Skinner’s model and the constructivist model
include semantic and pragmatic variables in the center of
linguistic development. For both models, the development
of grammar should be contextualized. Table 1 displays an
example of the development of the imperative formulas
(Gallo, 1994b), comparing the two types of knowledge:
semantic and grammatical.
The constructivist model, which has slowly become an
alternative to the Chomskian model, is in accordance with
the Skinnerian conception, much revised and extended, of
linguistic learning as a process of ontogenetic, gradual, and
adaptive change. The functionality that penetrates the entire
Skinnerian model is again claimed after many years during
which the predominant focus of interest was excessively
formal. According to Rivière (1991), the notion of a system
that incorporates logical principles into its neural networks
calls for concordance with the properties of the central
nervous system. From this perspective, two properties stand
out: adaptability, synonym of flexibility and ontogenetic
change, and intentionality, synonym of meaningful activity.
In addition to the above-mentioned contributions, the
importance of Skinner’s work consists of its having
turned–definitively–human behavior into an object of study,
unshackling it from the spirit. Its merit is not to have been a
pioneer in this attitude, but to have divulged it, turning
scientific inspection of human activity into something natural.
And he did this with wit. In 1934, Whitehead challenged
Skinner to functionally explain the following linguistic
utterance: No black scorpion has fallen on this table. He
accompanied this utterance with the following comment:
“Science can explain any human behavior except for verbal
behavior.” Skinner replied that to ask such a thing of
behaviorism was “unfair” (Skinner, 1957, p. 457) and wrote
that the very next morning, he began to write Verbal Behavior. 
Table 1
Development of the Imperative Formulas. Comparison of Semantic and Grammatical Knowledge. (Gallo 1994b)
Age Semantic Knowledge Morphosyntactic Knowledge Example
1.09 Action Imperative Sienta [sit]  
1.10 Action + Person Clitics Pome [Put on me]
2nd Person Sientas [You sit]  
2.01 Negation Subjunctive No te vayas [Don’t go]  
2.04 Consequence Subordinate No jubas, la tiro la tapa 
[Don’t come up or I throw away the top] 
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